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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Lloyd Hardin McNeil appeals from the district court's amended order of 
restitution, entered in conjunction with McNeil's conviction for the voluntary 
manslaughter of Natalie Davis, first degree arson, and grand theft. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Following a jury trial, McNeil was convicted of manslaughter for killing Natalie 
Davis, of first degree arson for attempting to incinerate her house with her dead corpse 
inside of it, and of grand theft for stealing all of her personal belongings. (39881 R., 
pp.261-63.) In conjunction with McNeil's judgment of conviction, the state sought and 
was granted $28,692.22 in restitution. (39881 R., pp.270-73; 276-77.) 
McNeil objected to the order asserting that he would not be able to pay restitution 
due to the length of his sentence and otherwise challenging several individual items of 
restitution. (39881 R., pp.274-75; R., pp.20-24.) The district court held a restitution 
hearing. (R., p.27.) At the hearing, McNeil clarified his restitution objections (Tr., p.7, 
L.4 - p.9, L.1) and the state stipulated that certain reductions were appropriate (Tr., 
p.11, L.21 - p.12, L.13). The district court determined that some items of restitution 
were inappropriate, some needed more foundation, and others were appropriate. (Tr., 
p.13, L.18-p.14, L.11.) 
The state ultimately filed a motion to modify restitution (R., pp.28-29) and the 
district court entered an amended order of restitution, requiring McNeil to pay 
$21,611.67 (R., pp.32-33). McNeil filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court's 
amended order of restitution. (R., pp.34-36.) 
1 
ISSUE 
McNeil states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it overruled Mr. McNeil's objections to 
$960.80 of the restitution award? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has McNeil failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by ordering 
restitution? 
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ARGUMENT 
McNeil Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering 
Restitution 
A. Introduction 
In its amended order of restitution, the district court required McNeil to pay 
restitution in the amount of $21,611.67 for economic damages which resulted from his 
killing of Natalie Davis, attempting to burn her house to the ground, and stealing all of 
her worldly possessions. (R., pp.32-33.) McNeil challenges the restitution award, 
arguing that he should not be required to compensate Mr. Ken Davis, Natalie's father, 
for counseling sessions or for the plane ticket her brother had to purchase to transport 
her body to her funeral. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-9.) Review of the applicable law, 
however, demonstrates that Natalie Daivs's immediate family members are victims who 
suffered economic losses which can be compensated under the restitution statute. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed to the 
trial court's discretion. State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206,211, 296 P.3d 412,417 (Ct. App. 
2013). The trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will not be disturbed if 
supported by substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 
276 (2013). 
C. The District Court's Order Of Restitution Is Appropriate Under Idaho Code § 19-
5304 
The district court ordered McNeil to pay $1,760 in restitution to Mr. Ken Davis, 
father of Natalie Davis. (R., p.33.) Included in this amount was money for counseling 
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sessions and out-of-pocket expenses associated with transporting Natalie Davis's body 
to funeral. Both are appropriate under the restitution statute. 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes a court to "order a defendant found guilty of 
any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make restitution to the 
victim." For purposes of Idaho's restitution statute, a "victim" includes "the immediate 
family of the actual victim in homicide cases." I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(i). Mr. Davis, Natalie 
Davis's father, is therefore a victim. "Economic loss" includes "direct out-of-pocket 
losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from the criminal conduct." 
I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a). The out-of-pocket expenses for both transporting Natalie's body to 
her funeral and her parents' counseling sessions are thus contemplated by the statute. 
Additionally, "in order for restitution to be appropriate, there must be a causal 
connection between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the injuries 
suffered by the victim." State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011 ). 
"[C]ausation consists of actual cause and true proximate cause." Corbus, 150 Idaho at 
602, 249 P.3d at 401 (citing State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374, 223 P.3d 750, 757 
(2009)). The Idaho Supreme Court has articulated the distinction between actual and 
proximate cause as follows: 
Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event 
produced a particular consequence. The "but for" test is used in 
circumstances where there is only one actual cause or where two or more 
possible causes were not acting concurrently. On the other hand, true 
proximate cause deals with whether it was reasonably foreseeable that 
such harm would flow from the negligent conduct. In analyzing proximate 
cause, this Court must determine whether the injury and manner of 
occurrence are so highly unusual "that a reasonable person, making an 
inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, 
would not have reasonably expected the injury to occur. 
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(internal citations and quotations omitted). The determinations of actual cause and 
1. 
cause are both factual questions. kl 
Requiring McNeil To Pay Restitution For Counseling Sessions Which 
Occurred After He Killed Natalie Davis Is Appropriate 
Below, McNeil objected generally to restitution for "family psychotherapy," 
asserting that the counseling was for a preexisting condition because the counseling 
sessions began before McNeil killed Natalie Davis. (R., pp.22-23.) During the hearing, 
McNeil clarified that his objection was to counseling sessions which occurred prior to 
Natalie Davis's death. Defense counsel stated: 
The psychotherapy for the family, Jan and Ken Davis, that just 
came to our attention because they are asking for counseling before 
Natalie even died, and so they were in therapy before she died, so clearly 
that's not a consequence of my client's actions and should not be ordered 
as part of the restitution. 
Now, the counseling goes on past Natalie's death, and so I guess 
an argument can be made that at that point it then becomes relevant, but 
they are asking for-the paperwork that we received is that the therapy 
began February 19th. Natalie didn't die until March 5th, so I'm not sure 
why they are asking for therapy that happened before she even died. 
(Tr., p.7, Ls.9-23.) The state agreed that counseling sessions prior to Natalie Davis's 
death were inappropriate for restitution and stipulated to a reduction. (Tr., p.11, L.21 -
p.12, L.5.) The district court accordingly reduced the counseling costs by $60.00. (Tr., 
p.13, Ls.18-21.) 
On appeal, McNeil notes that two counseling sessions occurred prior to Natalie's 
death, not just one. (Appellant's brief, p.7; see also R., p.22.) The Davises sought 
counseling on February 19 and 26, 2011, before McNeil killed Natalie Davis on March 5, 
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11. (R., p.22.) The Davis's counseling sessions did not resume again until May 3, 
2011, well after Natalie's death, and continued through May, June, July, and into 
November. (Id.) Recognizing these facts, pursuant to its stipulation below, the state 
agrees that the restitution award should be reduced by an additional $60.00. 
On appeal, McNeil also argues that the counseling sessions were for a pre-
existing condition and restitution is therefore inappropriate in toto. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.6-7.) He acknowledges, however, that victims may claim restitution for damages 
which result from the aggravation of pre-existing conditions. (Id.) That McNeil's killing 
Natalie Davis would aggravate any need for counseling her parents may have had prior 
to her death is reasonably foreseeable. The homicide clearly caused the Davises deep 
grief, including feelings of guilt. (See 39881 PSI, pp.48-58, 233-34.) That McNeil's 
traumatic killing of their daughter aggravated the Davises' need for counseling is also 
supported by the frequency and timing of the counseling sessions: After two sessions 
in February, the Davises did not attend counseling again until May, whereupon they 
regularly attended through July. (R., p.22.) Because the Davises' need for counseling 
was aggravated by the grief caused by McNeil's killing their daughter, restitution for the 
counseling sessions which occurred after Natalie Davis's death was appropriate. 
McNeil should be ordered to pay $600.00 in restitution for the ten counseling 
sessions which occurred after Natalie Davis's death. 
2. Requiring McNeil To Pay Restitution For The Costs Associated With 
Transporting Natalie Davis's Body To Her Funeral Is Appropriate 
McNeil, both below and on appeal, also argues that it is inappropriate to order 
restitution for the cost of flying Natalie Davis's brother to her funeral. (Appellant's brief, 
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7-9; see also R., p.22.) This mischaracterizes the nature of restitution being sought. 
As explained by the state below, the plane ticket was so Mr. Hess, Natalie Davis's 
brother, could travel with her remains to the funeral. (Tr., p.12, Ls.14-16.) Corpses may 
not travel on an airline without an accompanying passenger. The plane ticket, 
therefore, was not so Mr. Hess could attend his sister's funeral; it was so Natalie Davis's 
body could be transported to her funeral. 
Applying the Corbus standard, McNeil caused the out-of-pocket expenses 
associated with transporting Natalie Davis's body to her funeral. But-for McNeil's killing 
of Natalie Davis, there would have been no funeral to transport her to. That Natalie 
Davis would need to be transported to her funeral is also a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of her being killed by McNeil. 1 Requiring McNeil to pay restitution for 
costs necessary to transport Natalie Davis's body to her funeral is therefore appropriate. 
A review of the evidence in this case supports the district court's award of 
restitution for counseling sessions and transporting Natalie Davis's body back to her 
funeral. Because restitution for the counseling sessions should only encompass the 
sessions which occurred after McNeil killed Natalie Davis, however, that amount should 
be reduced an additional $60.00. 
1 Even if Mr. Hess had not been accompanying the body to the funeral, the fact that he, 
as an immediate family member, would need to attend his sister's funeral is also 
reasonably foreseeable and so would be appropriate under the Corbus standard. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reduce the restitution award an 
additional $60.00, requiring McNeil to pay restitution in the amount of $21,551.67. 
DATED this 26th day of March, 2014. 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 26th day of March, 2014, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed 
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SPENCER J. HAHN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
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Deputy Attorney General 
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